The story of the Astros’ 2024 season will likely depend on the additional players they recruited along the way. The roster has been in flux all season as the club has struggled with injuries, ineffectiveness, and everything in between. On the pitching side, it has been largely successful.
We could look at the stats in detail, as I’m sure they did, but if we simply look at the ERAs before and after joining the team, the results are crystal clear. There were five or six guys between the rotation and the bullpen who either had a career renaissance or appeared for the first time because of the way this club handles pitchers. There’s a secret sauce, and we have too many examples to ignore by now.
That raises an obvious question. Is it possible that the Astros’ decision scientists and hitting coaches are doing the same thing? For much of the season, that hasn’t been the case. So is this a failure of those departments, or is the style of hitting just different? I’m certainly not a decision scientist. I have access to the same data you do. But some critical backstory is important here.
The Hollywood version of Moneyball left out some details from the book. It made it seem like it was all about on-base percentage. OBP is certainly important, but that wasn’t really the point of the book. The main point is that a patient approach, for example, isn’t something you can learn. It’s something a player brings with them automatically.
If that’s the case, then you scout players who have that trait. That turned over 100 years of scouting on its head. In addition to the basic five tools, there was a sixth tool that had to be considered. I might call that tool swing discipline. Others might call it patience or something else. The swing tool measures whether you can actually put the bat on what you’re swinging at. This swing discipline tool deals with what you’re swinging at.
Hitting is a reaction skill. A pitcher can easily change what he’s throwing or focus on hitting other parts of the plate. A hitter has to react to what’s being thrown. So asking a hitter to change his instincts is a lot harder than it sounds. Some can refine them over time, but hitters tend to be who they are. Jose Altuve has gotten more walks over the course of his career, but that’s largely because pitchers are pitching to him differently.
If that assumption is true, general managers and decision makers need to consider what they want their lineups to look like before they put them together. What kind of hitters do they want? These A’s teams wanted a lineup full of patient hitters who would work the counts. But even those lineups have their pitfalls. Patient hitters have more two-strike counts and, as a result, strike out more often.
There are three numbers that are important in this regard. Strikeout and walk rates are important, but Fangraphs also tracks something they call “OSwing.” We call that a hitter’s chase rate. The over/under rate on strikeouts is typically 20 percent. The over/under rate on walks is typically seven or eight percent. The water level on chase rate is usually 30 percent. That’s the percentage of pitches outside the strike zone that a hitter swings at.
Jose Altuve: 17.8% K-rate, 6.6% BB-rate, 37.9% chase rate
Alex Bregman: 13.4% K rate, 6.8% BB rate, 22.0% pursuit rate
Yordan Alvarez: 14.7% K-rate, 11.2% BB-rate, 31.5% chase rate
Yainer Diaz: 16.1% K-rate, 3.8% BB-rate, 41.8% chase rate
Jeremy Pena: 17.2% K-rate, 3.9% BB-rate, 36.4% chase rate
Jon Singleton: 27.8% K-rate, 11.3% BB-rate, 22.4% chase rate
Jake Meyers: 23.0% K-rate, 6.7% BB-rate, 30.6% chase rate
Mauricio Dubon: 12.8% K-rate, 3.7% BB-rate, 40.8% chase rate
Of course, this is a situation with good news and bad news. The good news is that when Singleton isn’t playing, no one on the Astros has a particularly high strikeout rate. Jake Meyers is a little above league average, but not outstanding. It should come as no surprise that the Astros are among the league leaders in avoiding strikeouts. Of course, that brings us to the downside.
When Singleton is out of the lineup, Yordan is the only Astro who gets more walks than average. Also, only Alex Bregman is significantly better than average in chase rate. This follows a certain pattern. The Astros put the ball in play and do so early in the counts, so when they hit, it can look nice. When those hits don’t fall, the starting pitchers avoid those high pitch counts.
The return of Kyle Tucker will be very helpful, but the scientists’ decision fell on Ben Gamel and Jason Heyward. We can look at their careers and 2024 numbers to see if the Astros fall for the Moneyball approach or just hang on to every port in every pinch.
Ben Gamel 2024: 25.5% K-rate, 16.4% BB-rate, 21.3% chase rate
Ben Gamel Career: 24.6% K-rate, 10.3% BB-rate, 24.2% chase rate
Jason Heyward 2024: 18.3% K-rate, 8.3% BB-rate, 31.7% chase rate
Jason Heyward Career: 17.6% K-Rate, 10.2% BB-Rate, 25.2% Chase Rate
We’re seeing some dip in Heyward’s numbers, but that’s only a temporary option. Overall, this could be a good sign that the decision scientists are back in control here. Not only did they bring in two experienced hitters that everyone has heard of, but they also brought in two guys with the traits you want in your lineup.
When Tucker returns, we’ll likely see a platoon between the two, and that also means Dubon will play less often. On days when Singleton plays first, there are four batters with above-average walk rates and four to five batters with average to above-average chase rates. That’s a much more balanced lineup than what we’re seeing right now. Hopefully that means a much more consistent offense. Hopefully it will also be a model for the offseason when there are more options available.
